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Saba	Mahmood	is	not	a	huge	fan	of	political	secularism,	particularly,	in	its	modern	liberal	
expression	as	the	twin	principles	of	religious	liberty	(RL)	and	(religious)	minority	rights	(MR).	In	
her	book,	Religious	Difference	in	a	Secular	Age:	A	Minority	Report,	that	uses	the	beleaguered	
plight	of	the	Egyptian	Copts	to	think	of	secularism	“critically”,	Mahmood	contends	that	the	
culprit	for	their	state	of	siege,	suffering	discrimination	as	individuals	and	periodic	sectarian	
assault	from	religious	majority	Muslims	as	community,	is	not	so	much	the	incomplete	
secularism	of	Egypt,	Egypt’s	religiosity	as	one	might	be	tempted	to	think,	rather	its	Egypt’s	
political	secularism	per	se.	This	is	so	because	secularism’s	promise	of	freedom	of	
religion/minority	rights	granted	to	the	Copts	of	Egypt,	as	expressed	in	the	formal	liberal	legal	
system	of	Egypt,	fails	to	deliver	on	their	promise	of	protection	because	of	the	nature	of	state	
intervention	they	invite.	For	the	sad	fact	is	that	secularism’s	promise	quickly	turns	into	its	
threat.		The	liberal	legal	principle	of	“religious	liberty”	ends	up	giving	license	to	the	state	to	
define	and	regulate	the	very	religion	it	claims	to	grant	a	“laissez	faire”	to	and	its	promise	of	
minority	rights	only	adds	to	the	predicament	of	this	minority	by	defining	it	as	such.	The	minority	
status	makes	them	“stick	out	like	a	sore	thumb”	so	to	speak	exposing	them	to	further	attack	
and	causing	them	to	recoil	in	unhealthy	ways	in	their	particularity,	attached	to	their	church	and	
their	religious	doctrine,	and	driving	them	into	damaging	alliances	with	authoritarian	
dictatorships	for	protection.	This	is	not	the	lone	fate	of	the	religious	minority	of	Egypt,	
Mahmood	argues,	but	of	that	of	any	country	that	adopts	the	legal	liberal	expressions	of	
secularism	that	Egypt	does,	even	those	like	Western	democracies	historically	steeped	in	
secularist	traditions.	What	difference	in	status	Western	religious	minorities	have	from	the	Copts	
of	Egypt	can	only	be	attributed	to	the	difference	in	interpretation	religious	majorities	of	the	
respective	countries	end	up	giving	to	the	twin	legal	expressions	of	secularism	(RL	and	MR).	The	
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menace	of	secularism	on	these	religious	minorities	might	differ	but	it	is	there	wherever	
secularism	treads	its	liberal	path1.	
	
But	if	not	secularism	with	its	twin	liberal	principles	then	what?	It	is	not	entirely	clear.	
Mahmood’s	critical	discourse	sometimes	waxes	anarchist,	at	times	libertarian	and	at	many	
others,	traditionalist	conservative	(nostalgic	for	the	pre-modern).	For	instance,	she	offers	by	
way	of	nostalgic	references	to	the	premodern	times	of	the	Ottoman	empire	a	possible	
alternative	to	the	contemporary	globalized	ideal	of	political	secularism,	riding	roughshod	on	the	
back	of	the	overbearing	modern	state,	when	Ottoman	religious	(non-Muslim)	communities	
enjoyed	an	independent	corporate	status	as	Ahl	Al	Zimma	in	exchange	for	accepting	their	
formal	inequality	to	the	Muslim	majority	of	the	self-avowedly	Muslim	Caliphate.	The	idea	being	
that	the	pre-	modern	state	is	not	as	heavily	interventionist	as	the	modern	one	choosing	instead	
to	run	its	various	communities	through	six	degrees	of	separation	that	had	allowed	such	
communities	independence	in	defining	their	internal	doctrines	and	in	running	their	communal	
affairs.	If	they	had	to	pay	Jizya	(tax)	to	buy	off	their	corporate	independence	and	if	they	had	to	
be	formally	placed	as	second	in	status	to	the	Muslim	majority	then	the	trade-off	may	not	have	
been	so	bad.	In	other	words,	Mahmood	seems	to	suggest	that	the	trade-off	between	second-
class	status	for	corporate	status	is	superior	to	the	one	posited	by	the	modern	secular	state	
between	equal	citizenship	for	minoritarian	status	combined	with	the	grant	of	religious	liberty.	
																																																						
1	Mahmood	says,	“While	Islamic	concepts	and	practices	are	crucial	to	the	production	of	this	inequality,	I	argue	that	
the	modern	state	and	its	political	rationality	have	played	a	far	more	decisive	role	in	transforming	preexisting	
religious	differences,	producing	new	forms	of	communal	polarization,	and	making	religion	more	rather	than	less	
salient	to	minority	and	majority	identities	alike.	Furthermore,	I	suggest	that	insomuch	as	secularism	is	
characterized	by	a	globally	shared	form	of	national-political	structuration,	the	regulation	of	religious	difference	
takes	a	modular	form	across	geographical	boundaries.	Two	paradoxical	features	of	this	secular	political	rationality	
are	particularly	germane.	First,	its	claim	to	religious	neutrality	notwithstanding,	the	modern	state	has	become	
involved	in	the	regulation	and	management	of	religious	life	to	an	unprecedented	degree,	thereby	embroiling	the	
state	in	substantive	issues	of	religious	doctrine	and	practice.	Second,	despite	the	commitment	to	leveling	religious	
differences	in	the	political	sphere,	modern	secular	governance	transforms—	and	in	some	respects	intensifies—	
preexisting	interfaith	inequalities,	allowing	them	to	flourish	in	society,	and	hence	for	religion	to	striate	national	
identity	and	public	norms.	While	these	features	characterize	all	modern	states,	in	the	case	of	non-Western	polities	
such	as	Egypt	they	are	often	judged	to	be	the	signs	of	their	incomplete	secularization.	
	
Mahmood,	Saba	(2015-11-03).	Religious	Difference	in	a	Secular	Age:	A	Minority	Report	(p.	2).	Princeton	University	
Press.	Kindle	Edition.	
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For	what	is	obtained	in	the	former	is	something	very	precious	indeed:	the	tentacles	of	the	state	
off	the	back	of	religious	communities.	Religious	Difference,	the	norm	Mahmood	wants	to	
protect,	is	thus	better	secured.	
	
But	if	pre-modern	times	could	not	be	redeemed	for	Foucault	through	historical	reversal,	then	
they	will	sadly	have	to	elude	Mahmood	his	pupil	too	(Mahmood’s	Foucaultianisms	left	me	with	
a	headache	without	making	me	the	wiser),	and	in	following	the	footsteps	of	her	mentor	in	his	
last	days,	she	ends	her	book	with	the	oblique	reference	to	“ethics”	as	our	refuge	from	the	
overbearing	state	as	a	more	“realistic”?	alternative.	She	says,	
	
This	hope	is	symptomatic	of	our	(not	just	Egyptians’)	collective	incapacity	to	
imagine	a	politics	that	does	not	treat	the	state	as	the	arbiter	of	majority-minority	
relations.	Given	this	context,	the	ideal	of	interfaith	equality	might	require	not	the	
bracketing	of	religious	differences	but	their	ethical	thematization	as	a	necessary	
risk	when	the	conceptual	and	political	resources	of	the	state	have	proved	
inadequate	to	the	challenge	this	ideal	sets	before	us.	
	
	
Sadly	for	us,	this	was	the	concluding	paragraph	of	the	book	and	we	are	left	with	no	guide	posts	
as	to	what	“ethical	thematization	as	a	necessary	risk”	meant	though	I	confess	it	left	me	with	the	
image	of	a	Coptic	pope	negotiating	a	peace	pact	with	a	Muslim	cleric	over	bitter	coffee,	on	the	
rights	and	wrongs	(not	rights	and	duties)	of	inter	communal	social	relations.	It	also	left	me	with	
the	queasy	feeling	that	the	ethics	of	the	religious	Patriarchs	may	not	at	all	prove	superior	to	the	
rights	and	duties	of	the	modern	liberal	state,	au	contraire,	decidedly	inferior.		In	fact,	I	think,	it	
is	Mahmood’s	wager,	and	she	hints	at	this	here	and	there	in	her	book,	that,	left	to	their	own	
corporatist	devices,	religious	patriarchs	are	more	likely	to	tread	the	path	of	doing	the	right	
thing,	ethically,	than	they	would	be	when	they	are	under	the	sleepless	panoptical	eye	of	the	
liberal	legalist	state.	How	this	could	be	done	is	a	question	that	is	left	hanging	in	The	Minority	
Report,	much	as	the	thesis	that	female	submissiveness	among	religiously	conservative	women	
in	Egypt	required	relativist	understanding	from	feminists	did	in	The	Politics	of	Piety,	Mahmood’s	
previous	book.	
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Liberty	as	Right	
	
Mahmood	writes,		
	
While	I	appreciate	the	protections	and	freedoms	that	secularism	might	extend	to	
religious	dissenters	and	nonbelievers,	I	would	also	like	to	point	out	that	political	
secularism	is	not	merely	the	principle	of	state	neutrality	or	the	separation	of	
church	and	state.	It	also	entails	the	reordering	and	remaking	of	religious	life	and	
inter	confessional	relations	in	accord	with	specific	norms,	themselves	foreign	to	
the	life	of	the	religions	and	peoples	it	organizes.	This	dimension	of	political	
secularism-shot	through	as	it	is	with	paradoxes	and	instabilities-needs	to	be	
understood	for	the	life	worlds	it	creates,	the	forms	of	exclusion	and	violence	it	
entails,	the	kinds	of	hierarchies	it	generates,	and	those	it	seeks	to	undermine.	
The	two	dimensions	of	political	secularism-its	regulatory	impulse	and	its	promise	
of	freedom-are	thoroughly	intertwined,	each	necessary	to	the	enactment	of	the	
other.		
	
Mahmood	is	absolutely	right	that	secularism	reorders	religious	life	according	to	norms	foreign	
to	the	life	of	those	who	practice	such	religions.	Of	course	it	does;	in	fact,	as	a	secularist	myself,	I	
should	hope	it	does.	If	the	opposite	were	true,	if	the	principle	of	no	separation	between	church	
and	state	were	to	prevail,	then	secularists	like	me	would	have	had	their	own	lives	upended	
instead	and	in	ways	that	the	specific	interpretation	of	the	principle	of	no	separation	in	our	state	
would	dictate.	We	may	have	to	veil	in	public.	We	may	have	to	be	shepherded	to	mid	day	
prayers	in	our	work	places.	We	may	have	to	lie	to	public	enforcers	about	not	fasting	in	
Ramadan.	Many	terribly	unsecular	things,	“foreign	to	the	lives”	of	us	secularists	would	have	to	
take	place	and	we	won’t	like	it	one	bit.	
	
Better	they	than	us,	I	say!	
	
This	is	all	to	say	that	the	fact	that	secularism	upends	the	life	of	the	religious	is	nothing	more	
than	an	expression	of	its	normative	victory	over	the	counter	norm-	no	separation	between	
church	and	state-	that	lurks	in	the	shadow,	just	about	everywhere,	as	an	alternative	organizing	
legal	principle.	In	so	far	as	Mahmood	claims	to	be	thinking	of	secularism	“critically”	by	pointing	
this	particular	feature	of	secularism	then	I	am	afraid	she	has	instead	merely	reiterated	the	
	 5	
obvious.	This	is	not	exactly	a	feature	of	“secularism”	alone,	rather,	any	prevailing	legal	norm:	
legal	norms	bite	and	this	is	just	the	way	that	legal	norms	of	secularism	do!	
	
It	is	when	Mahmood	argues	that	the	“regulatory	impulse”	of	secularism	in	fact	contradicts	its	
promise	of	religious	liberty	that	I	find	myself	pausing.	To	be	more	precise,	what	is	baffling	to	me	
is	the	argument	that	legal	regulation	and	liberty	are	opposites,	that	to	point	to	the	regulatory	
aspects	of	secularism	is	to	catch	secularism’s	claim	of	guaranteeing	religious	liberty	in	a	gotcha	
moment:	red	handed	committing	an	obvious	contradiction.		
	
This	is	so	because	liberty	and	regulation	are	not	exactly	opposites.	Liberty	can	only	express	itself	
in	regulated	form	and	to	think	of	regulation	as	a	damper	on	liberty	is	to	be	guilty	of	formalist	
reasoning	that	holds	little	water	on	close	inspection.	In	fact,	and	contrary	to	Mahmood’s	
analysis,	in	which	“religious	liberty”	is	discussed	independently	from	“minority	rights”	allocating	
a	chapter	for	each,	religious	liberty	is	nothing	but	minority	rights.	This	is	so	because	liberty	is	
broken	down	to	a	bundle	of	claims,	privileges,	powers,	and	immunities	that	regulate	the	
relationship	of	citizens	of	the	state	on	the	question	of	religion.	The	total	sum	of	these	claims,	
privileges,	powers	and	immunities	is	what	we	call	“rights”	and	they	are	one	and	the	same	as	
‘religious	liberty”.	For	how	a	state	chooses	to	distribute	these	sets	of	privileges,	claims,	powers	
and	immunities	on	the	question	of	religion	is	what	distinguishes	its	own	mode	of	secularism	
from	the	next.	Each	distribution	affects	majority/minority	relations	differently,	a	difference	that	
is	obscured	if	one	read	the	signifier	RL/MR	formally,	the	way	Mahmood	does,	and	it	is	also	a	
difference	that	may	very	well	be	worth	dying	for.		
	
Take	for	instance	the	practice	of	“veiling”	in	a	Muslim	majority	country	that	adopts	RL/MR	in	its	
legal	system.	A	woman	might	have	a	“right	to	veil”	in	this	state	as	an	instance	of	her	religious	
liberty	but	this	could	mean	different	things	legally.	It	certainly	means	and	at	minimum	that	she	
doesn’t	have	a	duty	to	veil.	For	if	she	does,	then	the	privilege	to	wear	the	veil,	which	the	“right	
to	veil”	entails	is	taken	away	from	her.	But	a	state	that	sees	the	“right	to	veil”	as	an	expression	
of	religious	liberty	might	legally	interpret	this	right	as	allowing	the	woman	to	wear	the	veil	
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anywhere	in	public.	But	then	it	could	do	so	but	create	an	exception	to	the	exercise	of	the	
privilege	of	veiling	in	certain	places	such	as	say	“private	schools”	administered	by	Christian	
missionaries.	Those	schools	are	given	the	option	of	refusing	to	admit	veiled	women	as	students	
even	though	public	schools	financed	by	the	state	are	prohibited	from	doing	so.	The	argument	
being	that	Christian	schools	as	are	allowed	to	choose	what	violates	the	religious	liberty	of	their	
students	within	the	confines	of	their	own	administered	schools	and	if	they	consider	veiling	as	
introducing	Muslim	symbolism	in	the	public	space	of	the	Christian	private	school	then	they	may	
very	well	choose	to	prohibit	wearing	it.	Alternatively,	a	state	might	prohibit	an	exception	as	the	
above	to	the	“right	to	veil”,	seeing	in	the	exception	a	violation	of	the	Muslim	girl’s	religious	
liberty	that	would	not	be	tolerated,	but	at	the	same	time	abstain	from	facilitating	the	right	to	
veil.	And	it	could	do	so,	by	prohibiting	preaching	the	veil	in	the	curriculum	or	class	pedagogy	of	
public	schools.	The	argument	being	that	preaching	the	veil	violates	the	religious	liberty	of	the	
Christian	student	minority.	Any	teacher	that	does	so	risks	being	expelled	from	his	or	her	job.	
But	then	a	state	could	do	the	opposite:	it	could	allow	for	an	exception	to	veiling	in	private	
schools	but	requires	the	assignment	of	state	curriculum	in	those	schools	that	advocates	veiling	
as	the	word	of	God	for	Muslims.	All	of	these	forms	of	regulation	are	expressions	of	the	“right	to	
veil”	itself	an	expression	of	“religious	liberty”	–no	duty	to	veil-itself	an	expression	of	what	
Mahmood	called	“culture	of	the	majority”	but	each	has	a	different	configuration	with	a	
different	distributive	consequence	for	the	majority	and	the	minority,	or	to	use	the	rather	vague	
and	literary	expression	that	Mahmood	uses,	each	“creates	a	life	form”	different	than	the	next	
one.		
	
	
	
Family	Law	
	
Mahmood	argues	that	contrary	to	common	perception	it	is	not	“religion”	that	creates	gender	
inequality,	rather	it	is	secularism,	its	very	opposite.	This	is	so	because	political	secularism	
“jams”	women,	family,	sexuality	and	religion,	in	the	same	place	“the	private”	(as	distinct	from	
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“public”)	creating	a	form	of	“cross-contamination”-	the	religious	appropriate	the	family	and	the	
family	acquires	the	quality	of	the	religious.	
	
In	Mahmood’s	words:	
	
I	argue	that	family	law,	as	an	autonomous	juridical	domain,	is	a	modern	invention	that	did	not	
exist	in	the	pre	modern	period.	It	is	predicated	upon	the	public-private	divide	so	foundational	to	
the	secular	political	order,	and	upon	a	modern	conception	of	the	family	as	a	nuclear	unit	
responsible	for	the	reproduction	of	the	society	and	the	nation.		Religion,	sexuality,	and	the	family	
are	relegated	to	the	private	sphere	under	this	system,	thereby	conjoining	their	legal	and	moral	
fates.	As	a	result,	family	law	has	come	to	bear	an	inordinate	weight	in	the	reproduction	and	
preservation	of	religious	identity.	
		
Note	here	how,	in	order	to	register	her	next	critique	of	“political	secularism”,	Mahmood	drops	
in	the	paragraph	above	all	reference	to	the	liberal	legal	complex	of	“liberty/rights”	that	
characterized	her	previous	discussion	and	transitions	to	another	one,	namely,	“the	
public/private”	one.	This	might	be	because	the	rule	that	addresses	all	Egyptians,	religious	
majority	and	minority:	“You	are	under	the	duty	to	marry	according	to	the	doctrine	of	the	
religion	you	are	born	into”	is	an	expression	neither	of	“religious	liberty”	nor	indeed	of	“minority	
rights”.	It	is	not	exactly	a	grand	expression	of	“secularism”.	Whatever	invisible	line	there	is	that	
separates	“secularism”,	with	all	the	internal	possibilities	of	its	articulation,	is	crossed	here	to	
something	that	is	“not-secularism”.		
	
If,	however,	the	Egyptian	state	kept	the	rule	above,	namely,	“the	duty	to	marry	according	to	
religious	law”,	but	also	allowed	for	an	opt-out	right	of	marrying	according	to	“civil	law”	and	
made	this	right	available	to	all	Egyptians,	then	we	would	still	be	within	the	domain	of	the	
“religious	liberty”	of	secularism.	But	then	if	such	an	option	existed,	many	Egyptians,	Muslims	
and	otherwise,	would	have	flocked	to	this	opt-out,	thereby	“minimizing”	religious	difference.	It	
would	then	be	hard	to	argue,	as	Mahmood	does,	that	it	was	“secularism”	that	exaggerated	
religious	“difference”	(or	gender	inequality);	and	the	more	common	one	that	it	was	unfinished	
secularism	that	was	the	culprit	would	make	much	more	sense.		
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Moreover,	it	would	be	preposterous	to	argue	that	a	state	that	regulates	marriage	according	to	
civil	law,	but	that	also	allows	people	to	marry	according	to	their	own	religious	ceremonies,	such	
as	the	US,	sits	on	the	same	“political	secularism”	spectrum	with	a	state	such	as	Egypt	that	
requires	people	to	marry	according	to	their	respective	religious	laws	just	because	both	laws,	
civil	and	religious,	are	passed	by	the	state.	They	may	sit	on	the	same	“patriarchal”	spectrum,	
depending	on	the	particular	family	rules	passed	in	each;	they	may	sit	on	the	same	
public/private	divide	spectrum	with	the	family	treated	as	the	domain	of	the	“private”	in	both,	
but	they	can’t	possibly	be	described	as	sitting	on	the	same	“secularism”	spectrum.	To	expand	
the	meaning	of	“secularism”	to	everything	the	modern	state	passes	as	law	that	takes	religion	as	
its	object-	whether	it	permits	its	public	expression,	or	requires	it	or	prohibits	it-	is	to	make	
“secularism”	literally	incoherent	by	eroding	the	difference	between	it	and	its	opposite.	It	is	in	
effect	to	argue	that	living	in	a	state	that	orders	women	to	veil	in	public	such	as	Saudi	Arabia	and	
Iran	is	same	as	living	as	a	woman	in	a	state	such	as	the	US	that	does	not.		
	
To	do	so	risks	sounding	absurd.		
	
EIPR	(Egyptian	Initiative	for	Personal	Rights)	
	
As	I	mentioned,	I	could	not	have	written	Religious	Difference	in	a	Secular	Age	without	conducting	
work	with	EIPR	and	other	minority-rights	groups	in	Cairo.	However,	as	I	worked	with	these	
activists,	I	realized	that	the	assumptions	that	informed	their	work	were	not	simply	“theirs”	but	
belonged	to	a	global	political	discourse	that	exerts	an	immense	force	on	our	collective	
imagination…..	Upon	my	return	from	Egypt,	as	I	began	the	process	of	analysis	and	writing,	I	was	
compelled	to	dig	beyond	the	ethnographic	encounter	to	grasp	fragments	of	the	past	congealed	
into	the	present….this	process	in	turn	required	an	engagement	with	historical	materials	from	18th	
century	to	the	present…The	book	thus	could	not	have	been	born	without	the	ethnographic	
encounter,	but	also	had	to	transcend	it	in	order	to	make	sense	of	what	I	encountered.		
	
This	has	become	somewhat	of	a	familiar	trope2:	the	anti-enlightenment	US-based	academic	
“transcends	the	ethnographic	encounter”	with	the	local	activist	who	had	gone	out	of	his/her	
way	to	host	and	assist	the	visiting	anthropologizing	academic,	by	discovering,	upon	going	back	
																																																						
2	It	is	so	familiar	I	am	starting	to	think	it	is	necessary.	I	have	commented	on	it	twice:	
See		
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/lama-abu-odeh/holier-than-thou-antiimperialist-versus-local-activist	
and		
	
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15350	
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home	to	America,	to	where	the	land	of	enlightenment	is	you	might	say,	that	the	local	activist	
was	in	the	grip	of	an	enlightenment	discourse	that	was	globalized	(bummer!)	but	that	had	the	
problem	that	it	limited	“our	collective	imagination”!	The	sense	of	admiration	the	academic	may	
have	had	for	the	work	of	the	activist	when	they	were	in	the	very	local	place,	and	Mahmood	is	
full	of	praise	for	the	work	of	the	lawyers	of	EIPR,	becomes	a	tad	ambivalent	from	a	distance	as	
the	activist	now	appears	to	be	suffering	some	kind	of	a	“false	consciousness”,	you	know,	the	
type	you	have	when	you’re	into	too	much	enlightenment!	
	
As	I	know	some	of	the	lawyers	who	work	at	EIPR	and	as	I	am	familiar	with	the	work	they	do,	I	
find	it	hard	to	believe	that	those	lawyers	were	not	aware	that	“the	assumptions	that	informed	
their	work	were	not	simply	theirs!”	They	knew	all	right	that	they	were	part	of	a	globalized		
rights	movement	and	that	they	were	deploying	the	international	language	of	human	rights:	
religious	liberty,	minority	rights	and	all!		I	suspect	though	that	these	lawyers’	secularism,	which	
they	had	put	into	good	activist	use	on	behalf	of	the	Copts	and	other	religious	minorities	through	
careful	deployment	of	rights	discourse,	didn’t	go	down	well	with	Mahmood	whose	academic	
agenda,	as	this	book	quite	amply	represents,	is	antagonistic	to	secularism.		
	
And	even	though	“the	assumptions	that	informed	[these	lawyers’]	work…	belonged	to	a	global	
political	discourse”,	contrary	to	Mahmood,	I	think	these	assumptions	were	very	much	“theirs”.		
For	Mahmood	makes	much	of	the	tainted	origins	and	the	bad	company	that	“political	
secularism”	had	historically	kept	in	its	long	and	illustrious	traveling	career	across	the	oceans.	
From	its	early	origins	as	a	ruse	to	allow	European	powers	to	intervene	in	the	affairs	of	the	
Ottoman	Empire	on	behalf	of	religious	minorities,	to	its	later	association	with	bad	projects	such	
as	neoliberalism,	American	Evangelism,	and	Copts	of	the	US	diaspora,	“religious	liberty”	
knocked	on	the	door	of	the	“orient”	threateningly	in	the	context	of	“differential	sovereignty”.		
As	the	recipients	of	secularism	gave	no	proper	“consent”,	and	even	worse,	something	precious	
was	lost	in	the	process,	namely,	“religious	difference”,	this	secularism	became	irredeemably	
tainted	for	Mahmood.	Its	globalism	was	imperialism	simpliciter,	or	so	seemed	the	suggestion	of	
The	Minority	Report.		
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And	yet	what	the	EIPR	lawyers	did	so	well	and	so	effectively	was	to	see	in	this	secularism	its	
universalist	promise	and	by	putting	it	to	good	activist	use	made	it	very	much	their	own.	For	
“RL/MR”	the	defining	principles	of	secularism	is	nothing	but	a	compromise	formation	on	the	
twin	universal	norms	of	equality	(of	citizenship)	and	liberty	(of	religious	practice),	the	details	of	
which,	how	it	would	be	translated	into	laws	and	regulations,	was	an	object	of	struggle	for	rights		
that	these	lawyers	chose	to	wage	and	push	to	define.	As	I	tried	to	show	in	my	discussion	of	the	
possible	rules	that	this	configuration	could	produce,	the	difference	between	the	one	and	the	
other	may	very	well	be	a	difference	worth	dying	for!	Rather	than	“limit	the	imagination”,	it	was	
the	very	stuff	that	fired	it	up!	
	
Far	from	seeing	the	inevitable	complexity	of	the	compromise	formation	equality/liberty	of	
secularism	as	these	lawyers	did,	Mahmood	treated	any	incursion	from	the	former	(equality)	on	
the	latter	(liberty)	paranoia-cly,	as	only	a	radical	libertarian	would	do.	Any	form	of	regulation	of	
religious	liberty,	or	what	she	likes	to	call	“religious	difference”,	for	the	purposes	of	promoting	
equality	was	excoriated	as	too	intrusive	and	used	to	show	the	“contradiction	and	paradox	of	
secularism”.		
	
In	short,	while	EIPR	lawyers	struggled	for	Egyptians	to	be	equal	and	free	in	the	only	state	they	
knew	and	lived	in,	Mahmood	waxed	libertarian	(denouncing	regulation),	anarchist	(denouncing	
the	state)	and	religious	conservative	(nostalgic	for	the	Ottoman)	all	at	the	same	time!	
	
She	may	win	the	contest	on	“imagination”,	but	the	one	on	“justice”,	I	am	afraid	the	EIPR	
lawyers	will	have	to	win	each	time.			
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Conclusion	
	
Reading	The	Minority	Report	was	a	very	odd	experience.	A	book	on	secularism	in	Egypt	that	
doesn’t	make	a	single	reference	to	Al	Sahwa	Al	Islamiyya	(“The	Islamic	Awakening”)	the	social	
phenomenon	that	has	haunted	the	lives	of	Copts	(as	well	as	Muslims),	for	decades	now,	and	
pushed	them	to	either	migrate	to	the	West	in	waves	in	fear	for	their	lives	and	livelihood	or	to	
alternatively	seek	protection	by	supporting	dictatorships,	leaves	the	reader	thinking	that	they	
had	just	finished	reading	not	a	tract	on	theory	exactly,	but	on	ideology,	and	not	the	good	kind!	
	
It	seems	odd	not	to	engage	with	a	phenomenon	the	Egyptian	historian	Sherif	Younis,	describes	
in	this	manner:	
	 	
[Al	 Sahwa]	 has	 colored	 the	 lives	 of	 people	 across	 the	 span	 of	 forty	 years	 with	 the	 darkest	 of	
tones:	popularizing	accusatory	and	violent	language	as	well	as	the	sense	of	grievance	and	siege	in	
popular	and	semi	official	religious	discourse;	giving	rise	to	the	violence	of	explosions	and	suicides	
that	 has	 killed	 people	 and	 upended	 their	 lives,	 their	 livelihood	 and	 their	 sense	 of	 security;	
touching	the	lives	of	the	non	Christian	Arabs,	instilling	dread	and	fear	in	their	hearts,	threatening	
them	 in	 their	 possessions	 and	 nurturing	 sectarian	 feelings	 among	 the	 populace;	 it	 has	
undermined	 the	 status	 of	 women	 in	 society,	 threatened	 public	 rights	 and	 liberties,	 created	 a	
regime	 of	 censoring	 terror	 among	 writers	 and	 artists,	 and	 left	 a	 trail	 of	 death	 material	 and	
psychological	 in	 its	 trail…..	 All	 of	 this	 under	 the	 heading	 “The	 Return	 to	 Islam”	 whose	 grand	
theorist	was	Sayyed	Qutub.3	 
	
	
It	is	this	that	EIPR	lawyers	were	intervening	in	on	behalf	of	Al	Sahwa’s	victims.	Of	course,	there	
are	many	interesting	theoretical	questions	that	could	be	posed	about	this	secularism,	including	
the	role	of	the	modern	Egyptian	state	in	delimiting	its	compromised	form	and	the	ways	in	which	
it	is	complicit	in	this	Sahwa,	but	those	would	have	only	been	possible	if	sufficient	account	of	
what	that	secularism	was	intervening	in	was	offered	by	Mahmood.	Instead	what	was	produced	
was	something	of	a	mystification	in	which	“secularism”	itself	was	made	to	appear	as	if	it	were	
the	culprit	behind	Coptic	misery.	
	
																																																						
3	Talk	delivered	at	a	conference	in	Morocco	in	2014	entitled,	“Impediments	to	the	Renewal	of	Islamic	Discourse	
and	its	Dynamics:	Islam	as	a	Locus	of	Conflict”.	Manuscript	with	author.	
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The	Minority	Report	is	a	text	that	tries	to	respond	to	the	problem	of	essentializing	Islam	(the	
culturalism	problem)	by	performing	a	flip	so	that	all	the	bad	attributes	typically	associated	with	
“Islam”	are	now	attributed	to	secularism	instead.	It	is	secularism	that	discriminates,	that	is	
sectarian,	that	encourages	violence,	that	is	repressive,	sexist,	etc.	This	Mahmood	does	by	on	
the	one	hand	hyper-politicizing	secularism	(depleting	it	of	its	universalist	drive),	and	on	the	
other	under-politicizing	it	by	ignoring	its	internal	indeterminacy,	complexity,	open	structure	and	
varied	distributive	effects.		The	result	is	an	account	that	moves	between	crude	historicism-
secularism	is	its	history-	and	formalist	generalizations	reminiscent	of	the	ways	“Islam”	is	treated	
in	mainstream	discourse.	Islam	is	nothing	but	the	history	of	its	conquests	and	its	doctrines	
create	the	world	in	a	specific	way.		
	
But	a	flip	does	not	a	critique	make.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
